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What makes each of us, as individuals, human to one another, or, more generally, 
what makes an individual creature human? We have not often had to ask the question 
because of the species line based on reproductive capacity and incapacity, although 
“degrees of humanness” were explored in the various eugenic programs of the last 
century. Now the biotechnological possibility of fusing human and other forms of life is 
presenting the question in a new and serious way. If the traditional biological means of 
defining species are no longer reliable, what other criteria might determine what is 
“human” and what is “nonhuman”? The issue is not just how to conceive of an 
individual hybrid presented to us, but how to act toward the creature, at the most basic 
level. Drawing on animal law and theory as well as the history of human eugenics in law 
and policy, Vining identifies criteria that may one day be used to gauge relative 
humanness, qualitative and quantitative. He observes that ultimately the difficulty of 
deciding or agreeing upon what identifies us as human will make even more problematic 
the current treatment of creatures deemed purely “animal.” In the end he suggests that 
what the human distinctively brings to the sentient world is general responsibility itself,
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and that wider contemplation of the real possibility of human-animal hybridization may 
lead to new ways of thinking about animals, in law and beyond.  
Human Identity was presented recently as a talk to a longstanding inter-
disciplinary faculty seminar at the University of Michigan. It is presented largely in its  





I want to talk to you about something that intrigues me increasingly, and 
that has been developing rapidly as I have been trying to think about it. I teach 
and write on what one might call the law of human experimentation, which is 
really an encounter between the legal view of the human being, especially the 
human individual, and the view of the human being that animates experimental 
work in science. The widespread efforts today to combine the human and the 
animal in a single creature as an experiment, and for purposes of 
experimentation upon the creature, come understandably within that interest in 
human experimentation, and ultimately I think will become a subject of 
widespread interest in law. It is ultimately in law, and not anywhere else, that we 
meet to decide what we can do to each other or indeed to other creatures.   
These new developments include the refinement of transplantation 
techniques that may allow combining fully developed parts of humans and 
animals, but most interesting are advances in genetic engineering, cloning 
techniques, and stem cell research generally that are making possible the mixing 
of human and animal cells and genetic material. Sometimes this latter is called 
the production of chimeras, or “chimerizing,” like the half-horse and half-man, 
the centaur, or the half-goat and half-man, the satyr. More often now it is 
referred to as hybridization, a term with quite positive connotations drawn from 
plant and animal breeding. 
The desire, effort, and spending of money to combine human and animal 
are pushed partly by pure curiosity, or by competitiveness among people who 
find themselves equipped to do it. Partly it is transgressive, and some involved 
have said as much.1 And partly it is driven by the hope of medicine that can 
reduce human suffering and vanquish human disease. It has come up of course 
against opposition to any human cloning and any experimentation on human 
creatures that cannot give consent, including the human in the womb. There are 
other grounds for opposing it too—among them, where cloning is involved, the 
difficulties in obtaining a supply of human eggs. 
                                                 
  1. See, e.g., David P. Barash, Humans Don’t Stand Outside Nature, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 25, 2005, at B7; Barash, Hurray for Monkey-Man!, L. A. TIMES, June 17, 2006, at 
B11. (Barash, an evolutionary psychologist, is among those especially active in debates on the 
meaning of natural selection and the question of limits on scientific experimentation.)  
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Whatever the reason for it, the combining of the human and the animal in 
a single creature is with us. British authorities have been holding consultations 
on the introduction of a human nucleus into a rabbit or cow egg.2 An ad hoc 
working group at Stanford University has approved a proposal to introduce 
human neural cells into a mouse embryo in an effort to produce a mouse—if you 
can still call it a mouse—with a brain composed of entirely “human” brain 
cells—if you can still can them “human.”3 Similar proposals are being considered 
elsewhere. The United States Patent Office recently ruled on and against a patent 
application for a creature with roughly equal portions of human and primate or 
other animal genetic material, though, notably, “animals” as such have been 
patentable in the United States ever since the Supreme Court ruled that an oil-
eating bacterium was patentable.    4
I also teach and write in animal law, an area of study and practice that 
now has its own state bar sections and law reviews, and as of recently its own 
endowment funds. Unlike the law of human experimentation, which essentially 
began with the Nuremberg Trials of doctors and scientists and the Nuremberg 
Code some sixty years ago, animal law is an “old” area going back to the early 
nineteenth century.  It is pertinent also to human/animal hybrids.   5
In animal law we are constantly trying to interpret and develop the 
criteria used for drawing lines between those animals that ought to be protected 
in substantial ways and viewed as having their own interests, interests that are 
not merely proxies for human interests, and those animals that are minimally 
                                                 
  2. BBC News, Human-Animal Embryo Green Light, Sept. 5, 2007, available  
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/health/6978384.stm (discussing a decision by British 
regulators to allow creation of certain human-animal hybrids). See generally DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH (U.K.), HUMAN TISSUES AND EMBRYOS (DRAFT) BILL (May 2007) (proposed legislation 
covering the use of human tissues and embryos in the United Kingdom), available at  
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsLegislation/DH
_074718. See also Paul Elias, Cloning Ideas Revisited, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 2007, at A4 
(comparing U.K. and U.S. policies regarding experimentation on human-animal hybrids). 
  3. Compare Henry T. Greely et al., Thinking About the Human Neuron Mouse, 7 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 27 (2007) (reviewing how the Stanford working group arrived at its conclusion) with 
Françoise Bayles and Jason Scott Robert, Part-Human Chimeras: Worrying the Facts, Probing the 
Ethics, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 41 (2007) (critiquing the working group's conclusions and guidelines). 
  4. For the Court’s decision, see Diamond v. Charkrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See generally 
Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 443 
(1999). For a discussion of the recent patent office decision, see Rick Weiss, Rifkin Files Human-
Chimp Chimera Patent, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1998, at A12. See also Rick Weiss, U.S. Denies Patent for 
a Too-Human Hybrid, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2005, at A3. See also Aaron Zitner, Patently Provoking a 
Debate, L. A. TIMES, May 12, 2002, at A1. 
  5. See An Act to prevent the cruel, improper Treatment of Cattle (Martin’s Act), 3 George IV 
ch. 71, 1822 (U.K.)(making it a crime to abuse certain domestic animals). See HILDA KEAN, ANIMAL 
RIGHTS: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN BRITAIN SINCE 1800 33-34 (1998) (discussing the 
development and passage of Martin’s Act). On the Nuremberg Trials and the Nuremberg Code, 
see THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 
(G.J. Annas and M.A. Grodin eds., 1992). 
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protected, principally as cogs in the ecological machinery that ultimately 
supports human life. The line between the elephant or whale on one hand and 
the flea or fire ant on the other is not merely one of size. Chimpanzees admitted 
into a federal sanctuary under the Federal Chimpanzee Health Improvement, 
Maintenance and Protection Act of 2000 are a particularly clear example of 
animals with legally recognized individual interests. Once in sanctuary, “none of 
the chimpanzees may be subjected to euthanasia, except as in the best interests of 
the chimpanzee involved.”    6
A common feature of these line-drawing criteria, that is seen from context 
to context, is (as might be expected) how close the animal is to the human—in 
gross terms, whether the animal is vertebrate rather than invertebrate, warm-
blooded rather than cold-blooded, mammal rather than egg-laying. And, as one 
watches or participates in finer line drawing and then ranking of animals in a 
hierarchy of protection, with us at the top, one cannot escape a very definite 
sense that we are simultaneously telling ourselves what makes us human.   
For example, a bond of mutual affection between parents and children, as 
a line-drawing criterion, can go rather far down the hierarchy, and can operate 
within the more general categories, as in the Marine Mammal Protection Act. The 
Act singles out for special protection marine creatures that are mammals and, 
among them, singles out nursing mothers and their young.7 It has been 
concluded, after litigation over it,8 that this special protection of mothers and 
young cannot be understood in resource conservation terms, environmental, 
ecological, but only as proceeding from concern, expressed through Congress, 
for the bond perceived between nursing mother and nursling, and, indeed, 
concern for the vulnerability of the individual nursling.9 These concerns are, in 
another context, what make “maternal deprivation experiments” on primates so 
widely viewed as particularly heinous.    10
Across the board we look at our characteristics, those we value, and we 
ask whether those characteristics are shown by the creature in question. Lawyers 
have some latitude in doing this on behalf of the rest of us. The language in 
definitional sections of animal protection statutes is often deliberately vague. The 
                                                 
  6. Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 
287a-3a(d)(2)(I) (2007). 
  7. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (as amended), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1371, 
1372(b) (2007). 
  8. See Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1011-12 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding in 
particular provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act that “Congress meant to refer to 
individual animals, not groups or populations . . . There is surely no ‘resource management’ 
explanation for [the provisions at issue]”). 
  9. Id. 
  10. See generally DEBORAH BLUM, LOVE AT GOON PARK: HARRY HARLOW AND THE SCIENCE OF 
AFFECTION (2002) (biography of Harlow who conducted maternal deprivation experiments on 
primates). See also Robert Sapolsky, The Loveless Man, 287(5) SCI. AM. 95 (Nov. 2002) (reviewing 
Blum). 
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California definition of “animal,” for instance, continues to be “every dumb 
creature,”11 the Maine definition “every living, sentient creature not a human 
being.”12 It is simply “the animals” that now have constitutional status in 
Germany,13 “sentient beings” that figure in the European Union Treaty of 
Amsterdam.14 
But to ask the question regularly asked in contemporary animal law—
what is it that makes an animal “like” us, who are “fully human”?—is not 
entirely benign. It opens us to the eugenic temptation, picking out this or that 
characteristic or endowment that we know in ourselves, or can recognize, 
valuing it above other characteristics or endowments, and letting it determine 
our treatment of another being in the most basic of ways. “Eugenics,” going 
beyond ordinary selection in breeding, favors with life and active protection 
those with characteristics thought desirable, and eliminates now and for the 
future, or leaves without protection, those with characteristics we in our time 
and condition do not value. Human eugenics is human experimentation on a 
grand scale, and great names were associated with it here in the 20s and 30s. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes put succinctly the perceptions it involved in holding for 
the constitutionality of forcible eugenic sterilization of human beings in 1926, 
which then continued into the 1970s: “It is better for all the world,” Holmes 
ended, “if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let 
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit 
from continuing their kind.”15 
 The eugenic instinct on the human side went rather underground during 
and after the Second World War, but it is again with us today, inevitably I think, 
as private decisions are made, and public decisions are made about the limits of 
private decision—making, to “select in” or “select out” in human reproduction. 
“Selecting in” is the choice to implant a particular embryo after pre-implantation 
diagnosis in in vitro fertilization. “Selecting out” is the choice to terminate after 
testing an embryo already in development. The classification of a characteristic 
as a “disease,” or as a “defect” in humanness, such as deafness or dwarfism, is a 
prelude to the molding of the definition of what it is to be fully human that is 
implicit in eugenic decisions. Eugenics today has its very serious defenders. Peter 
                                                 
  11. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 599b (2008). 
  12. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 § 3907 (2007). See generally S. WAISMAN ET AL., ANIMAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 3-37 (3d ed., 2006). 
  13. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law], Article 20a (quoted in 
AXEL TSCHENTSCHER, THE BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ) 27 (Würzburg: Jurisprudentia, 2002)). See 
generally BTDrucks 14/8360 (providing an explanatory statement of Article 20a). See also Kate M. 
Nattrass, “. . . Und Die Tiere”: Constitutional Protection for Germany’s Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 283 
(2004). 
  14. Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on Protection and Welfare of Animals, Oct. 2, 1997 
(establishing the European Community’s legislative, regulatory, and interpretive guide “to 
ensure improved protection and respect for the welfare of animals as sentient beings”). 
  15. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (emphasis added). 
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Singer at Princeton argues for infanticide of hemophiliacs.16 James D. Watson, 
co-discoverer of DNA, looks to “genetic analysis to help work out the 
biochemical pathways underlying memory and clear thinking . . . [O]nly by 
reducing the differences in human beings will we ever have a society in which 
we can effectively view all individuals as truly equal.”    17
In the absence of eugenic thought a very great range is included in the 
human. Annie Dillard describes the “bird-headed dwarf” in For the Time Being,18 
“[S]eventy-five years old, no taller than a yardstick. And friendly and pleasant, 
but easily distracted . . . . [T]hey all can—and do—receive love and give love.” 
But as the ranking and especially action on the ranking of characteristics 
proceeds, the basic respect for all beings that are human in all their surprising 
variety, what we call “human equality” in law, begins to become the “true 
equality” to which James D. Watson points, achieved “by reducing the 
differences in human beings.”19 A being without the favored characteristics 
begins to slip outside and down from the circle of “human beings,” and be 
thought of as not “fully human.” 
That Charles Darwin himself thought and spoke in these terms is not often 
noted, much less emphasized. It is an embarrassment to read his words out loud, 
and I set them out here to indicate how easy it is for the admirable and admired, 
or any of us, to respond to the eugenic temptation. The subtitle of The Origin of 
Species was The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, and in The 
Descent of Man he looked forward:  
At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, 
the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate, and 
replace, the savage races throughout the world. At the same time 
the anthropomorphous apes . . . will no doubt be exterminated. The 
break between man and his nearest allies will then be wider, for it 
will intervene between man in a more civilized state, as we may 
hope, even than the Caucasian, and some ape as low as a baboon, 
instead of as now between the negro or Australian and the gorilla.    20
To speak of other beings as more human or less human, on some 
suggestion of a quantified scale, or divided between the fully human and the less 
than fully human, has clinging to it some of the horror of twentieth-century 
human experimentation, exploitation, and genocide. Describing beings as less 
                                                 
  16. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 185-91 (21st prtg. 2006). 
  17. ROBERT POLLACK, THE MISSING MOMENT 121-22 (1999) (quoting James D. Watson). 
  18. ANNIE DILLARD, FOR THE TIME BEING 5-6 (1999). 
  19. See POLLACK, supra note 17, at 121-22. 
  20. CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN (Penguin Books 2004) (1879) (quoted in 
MARILYNNE ROBINSON, THE DEATH OF ADAM: ESSAYS ON MODERN THOUGHT 34-35 (2005)). See also 
CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION (Harvard University 
Press 2001) (reproducing the title and subtitle of the 1859 first edition: ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 
BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION, OR THE PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE 
FOR LIFE). 
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human or less than fully human accompanied, possibly in some necessary way, 
the capacity to do what was done to them in Europe, in Africa, in Asia. And in 
the United States: I think we all, not just law students or historians, ought to be 
required to reread periodically the Dred Scott decision to keep us realistic about 
ourselves.21 The idea of a being as somehow less than human speaks directly to 
the way we treat and have treated animals, our doing to them what we say we 
would not do to a fellow human being, in the infliction of pain, suffering, death, 
even clear torture. But the phrase “less than fully human” also speaks to 
treatment of those who would otherwise be considered simply fellow “human 
beings”: historically, and even today, lines based on age or gender as well as race 
or ethnicity have been drawn between the fully human and the not fully human.   
And of course from the beginning Darwin or anyone following Darwin’s 
thought on “selecting out,” or to use Darwin’s word, “extermination,” has 
actively to decide which individual beings are of a higher sort and which of a 
lower, and by what criteria, since many beings above the human/animal line are 
mixtures of the categories we use to describe each other. We have a great deal of 
modern experience in trying to decide into which of our various human sorts 
and kinds an individual can be fitted or claim to be fitted. 
This is where human-animal hybrids become increasingly intriguing to 
me. You move from the sorting and ranking and treatment of kinds of animals, 
and sometimes individual animals, that we do in animal law according to their 
closeness to the human or their “possession” of currently valued characteristics 
of human beings. You move from that directly over, without a bump or a jump, 
to the eugenic in the treatment of human beings, according to their possession of 
characteristics similarly picked out. This slides quickly into thinking in terms of 
different degrees of being human. And then you move to the hybrid that asks us, 
as it were, whether it is human or animal and to what “degree” it is one or the 
other. It must ask and we must answer, because action turns on it. Perhaps we 
can turn the non-benign around, at least a bit, and look at the question in the 
positive rather than in the negative: When does a hybrid—or as the hybrid might 
say, “When do I”—become human enough to escape or modify treatment as an 
animal?   
Moreover, going about answering that question, being really forced to 
answer it, starts teasing out what we actually believe makes us “human,” or, the 
same thing for purposes of action, what makes us especially valuable. To the 
extent we eventually find ourselves really unable to answer the question, or to 
agree among ourselves on some answer, I think there will be pressure to move 
away from the basic human/animal dichotomy, and to begin thinking and 
talking in other, more evocative terms, such as whether another being is an 
individual in the sense that we can see ourselves as individuals. Hierarchy might 
                                                 
  21. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 383, 407, 411 (1856) (addressing the pre-Civil War federal 
constitutional status of free descendants of slaves). 
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be tilted even if it is never reversed—perhaps it would not be such a bad thing to 
be more like elephants and dolphins. Speaking in different terms might even 
lead us to value other beings not only for their exhibiting what we know and 
value, but for their difference, their strangeness, their opening to us, as human 
individuals around us do also, new perceptions and new realities. 
Let me briefly run through the ways we use or try to use to differentiate 
and decide whether or not to exclude from a circle of concern, or, more 
positively, whether to reach out beyond it and embrace. One is simply “looks”: 
the forms of ear, eye, nose, body, the criteria used in ordinary contemporary 
sorting that is not so genetic as Nazi racism was. To the extent looks make more 
possible a relationship between another creature and a full-fledged—no, full-
maned—human being, through the expressiveness of eyes or face, looks may 
have some relevance, and looks can go some distance. Something human or 
somewhat human might well look at us through camera eyes constructed just 
like ours but slightly improved, the superior camera eyes of an octopus, which is 
a mollusk. But the challenge of hybridization, crossing species lines, makes 
looking to “looks” difficult: the thought, the concern, is that something human 
might appear in a form quite nonhuman. Unrecognized, it might not be treated 
“appropriately” or “ethically,” to use the euphemistic words used in current 
discussion. As more than a footnote, it might suffer for just being in that form. 
Attention to the potential suffering of the number of “malformed” that would 
likely result before a successful human clone was born has been an important 
block to entering into human reproductive cloning at all.   22
A second way is quantitative, the proportions of a mix. Obviously the 
mixing of concern to us is not molecular mixing as such. Eating an animal is 
being very intimate with it, taking its materiality into the most delicate reaches of 
our own materiality. But though this would not be true of the Eucharist, today 
eating is not thought to be combining life with life; nor combining kind or 
                                                 
  22. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION (the “Shapiro Commission”), CLONING 
HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS III, 65-66, 108 (1997) (“The Commission 
concludes that at this time it is morally unacceptable for anyone in the public or private sector, 
whether in a research or clinical setting, to attempt to create a child using somatic cell nuclear 
transfer cloning. We have reached a consensus on this point because current scientific 
information indicates that this technique is not safe to use in humans at this time . . . [T]he 
significant risks to the fetus and physical well being of a child created by somatic cell nuclear 
transplantation cloning outweigh arguably beneficial uses of the technique . . . . At present, the 
use of this technique to create a child would be a premature experiment that exposes the 
developing child to unacceptable risks. This in itself is sufficient to justify a prohibition on 
cloning human beings at this time, even if such efforts were to be characterized as the exercise of 
a fundamental right to attempt to procreate. More speculative psychological harms to the child, 
and effects on the moral, religious, and cultural values of society may be enough to justify 
continued prohibitions in the future, but more time is needed for discussion and evaluation of 
these concerns.”) Cf. European Charter of Fundamental Rights, ch. I, art. 3(2), available at 
http://www.eucharter.org (“In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be 
respected in particular: . . . the prohibition of reproductive cloning of human beings.”). 
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species with our kind; nor the person built up in a relationship over time to 
which we give a name, Fido or Whiskers, with the person, ourself, we build up 
over time; nor the individuality of another with our individuality.   
The mixing of molecular material called genetic, in greater or lesser 
quantity, is another matter. We are still absorbing our surprise at the relatively 
small number of genes in the human genome beyond the number in a fruit fly, 
and the “96 to 99”23 in the percentage overlap between the chimpanzee genome 
and the human genome is mesmerizing, reminding us of how close a price of 99 
cents is to a dollar.   
But since genes are not identical units and it is so hard to think of the way 
they interact in quantitative terms, a quantitative measure of proportions of 
“animal” and “human” genetic material seems irrelevant to the question of 
relative humanness. The overlap between animal and human as now constituted 
could be taken as a sly message that the biblical account of the animals is not so 
very off the mark. By the end of the first chapter of Genesis it is clear they were 
not meant for food for human beings.24 In the second chapter they are created 
after that wonderful observation, “It is not good for Adam to be alone.”25 They 
appear explicitly as companions for Adam—the animal an “‘ezer kenegdo” in the 
original Hebrew, a term used elsewhere in the Bible to describe God in relation 
to humans and translated by Robert Alter as a “sustainer beside him”—before 
the turn to Eve who is “one flesh” with Adam.26 Not until the covenant after the 
Flood are animals given over for nourishment of human beings, and even at that 
point animals’ capacity to enter into a covenant is recognized—five times the 
covenant is presented as “between Me and you and every living creature that is 
with you.”27 
A current hybridization proposal in Britain, mentioned earlier, illustrates 
the difficulties of a quantitative criterion at the genetic level. If a nucleus of 
human origin is substituted through cloning techniques for the original nucleus 
of a rabbit egg (or cow or goat), and the being so formed develops, each of its 
                                                 
  23. See Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, Initial Sequence of the Chimpanzee 
Genome and Comparison with the Human Genome, 437(1) NATURE 69, 70 (Sept. 1, 2005). See also 
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, News Release Archives 2005, New Genome Comparison Finds 
Chimps, Humans Very Similar at the DNA Level (Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www. 
genome.gov/15515096. 
  24. Genesis 1:29-30 (King James)(“And God said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing 
seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree 
yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat. And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the 
air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every 
green herb for meat”). 
  25. Genesis 2:18. Cf. Vicki Hearne’s extraordinary book, ADAM’S TASK: CALLING ANIMALS BY 
NAME (1987). 
  26. ROBERT ALTER, THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES 22 (2004) (noting that “‘ezer kenegdo” in 
Genesis 2:18 is “notoriously difficult to translate”); Genesis 2:24. I am indebted to Madeline 
Kochen for discussion of the various translations of the term. 
  27. See ALTER, supra note 26, at 50-52; Genesis 1:29-30; 2:18-20, 23-24; 9:3, 10-13, 15-17. 
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cells is said to have a mixture of 99.9% human genes and .1% animal genes from 
the rabbit’s “somatic” or mitochondrial genetic material in the egg outside the 
nucleus that is not replaced when the nucleus is replaced.28 But though the 
nucleus of each cell of the creature is of human origin, why 96% to 99% of the 
genetic material the nucleus contributes should be thought to be “human” rather 
than, say, “chimpanzee,” given the chimpanzee/human genetic overlap, is a real 
question for purposes of quantitative identification of this being as human or 
animal—answerable only, I think, by saying interactions of an untraced kind 
transform the whole.    29
Of course it could also be said that a genetic overlap in numerical terms is 
relevant to the question “how human” a being is, in what lawyers would call a 
prophylactic way.   
You have first to put aside, on some ground relevant to the question—the 
question how to treat another being—all the genetic variation that there is within 
what we call the human, which we know is considerable but know rather little 
about. The “human genome” fully sequenced by Craig Venter’s project was 
Craig Venter’s genome, and the “human genome” sequenced by the National 
Institutes of Health was put together from a small number of individuals chosen 
for their “diversity.”30 No longer in the identity picture is the capacity or 
incapacity of a being to breed with another being, the species line, because 
hybridization is precisely a way of circumventing incapacity to breed.   
But if you do put aside this variation within what before the advent of 
hybridization would have been called a species, then pure quantity, it might be 
said, is relevant because what we human beings are is our genetic inheritance. 
The greater the numerical degree of genetic overlap between the human and the 
hybrid, the greater is the probability that what makes us human (whatever 
genetically it is) is included within the overlap.   
The numerical overlap could thus be viewed as a cautionary line. One 
should treat a being with a genetic endowment above some “overlap line” in the 
specially protective way we treat a human being, “specially protective” including 
                                                 
  28. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (U.K.),supra note 2, at 98; BBC News, supra note 2. On 
cloning techniques generally, see NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 
13-38 (Chapter 2, “The Science and Application of Cloning”). 
  29. See generally Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, supra note 23. 
  30. Each was different, as individuals are, and, necessarily chosen in advance of the 
establishment of “the human genome,” each was presumed to be “human” and not “subhuman.” 
The anonymous group did not, I imagine, include individuals judged by the standards of the 
time to be “malformed” or “defective.” On the source of the DNA sequenced, see Nicholas Wade, 
In the Genome Race, the Sequel Is Personal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2007, at F1; Nicholas Wade, Whose 
DNA Is It? In a Way, Nobody’s, N.Y. TIMES , June 27, 2000, at F2. See also Robin McKie, Human 
Genome is Mine, says ‘Darth Vader’ of Genetics, THE OBSERVER, Apr. 28, 2002, at 3; NATIONAL 
HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, News Release Archives 
2003, Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions: Whose DNA was  
sequenced for the Human Genome Project?, available at http://www.genome.gov/11006943.  
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some limits on quantitative and utilitarian thinking with respect to the 
individual. Beings that fall below the line should not be so protected.   
But the premise of such a justification of looking to genetic overlap is that 
all we are, what we bring to our incarnate presence, is our genetic code, which 
the systems of the world then act on and respond to in producing our changing 
form through life. If it were true that we were or that we actually thought we were 
the product however unique of just two factors—systems internal and systems 
external—there would be no reason to ask the questions hybridization is forcing 
us to ask. For purposes of action or restraint, we would not be distinguishable at 
base from any nonliving thing—the pebble in a stream whose internal systems 
have interacted with nature around it to give it its history and absolutely unique 
present form.    31
We move then to the cellular level. The being in question would have a 
mixture of animal cells and human cells or cells of human origin, for example 
through introducing human embryonic stem cells into an animal at some stage of 
development or introducing cells each carrying genetic material of both human 
and animal origin (from the cloning technique we have just noted). If the 
question is the treatment of such a being before birth, one issue would be 
whether the embryo is human or human enough for purposes of the “fourteen 
day limit.” This is the provision in statute in Britain and in guidelines here which 
prohibits experimentation on a human embryo after the fourteenth day of 
development, the time when the neural streak appears and, perhaps more 
importantly for many, when the possibility of twinning has passed and the being 
is definitely an individual.  Interestingly, the proposal to use cloning techniques 32
                                                 
  31. I recognize that this question or problem is often set out and discussed today as how to 
“explain” human dignity in terms of our current perception of organic evolution and its 
mechanisms. This becomes something of an academic exercise. The pressing question is rather 
the reverse, how to understand our current perception of organic evolution, our fascination with 
it and persuasion to it, while staying realistic and acknowledging our actual presence to one 
another—the mutual trust and recognition of each other as individuals on which we build any 
kind of belief about the world. I have tried to explore this, with regard to humans and animals 
both, in THE SONG SPARROW AND THE CHILD: CLAIMS OF SCIENCE AND HUMANITY (2004) and The 
Mystery of the Individual in Modern Law, 52 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1 (2007). For a broad and sensitive 
contribution to efforts to incorporate the evolutionary insight into human self-understanding, 
and for the history of these efforts, see GEORGE LEVINE, DARWIN LOVES YOU: NATURAL SELECTION 
AND THE RE-ENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD (2006). 
  32. See, e.g., Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37, § 3(3), (4) (Great Britain). 
Compare id. with NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN 
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH, GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 57 
(2004) [hereinafter NRC GUIDELINES] (providing guidelines for United States investigators); 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH, GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF HUMAN STEM 
CELL RESEARCH § 10.3a (Dec. 21, 2006). On the reasons for the fourteen day limit, see, for example, 
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, VOL. 1 at 45-
47 (“Time Limit for Human Embryo Research”), 65, 67 (“Principles and Guidelines”), VOL. 2 at 
55-56 (“Limitations Imposed on Permissible Research”)(1994); 73 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (1985) 
682 (remarks to House of Commons by Kenneth Clarke, Minister for Health in Great Britain: 
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to replace the nucleus of an animal egg with a human nucleus and let the 
resulting being develop has been accompanied by a pledge to observe the 
fourteen day limit.   
With a cellular focus, rather than a “looks” focus or a “molecular” focus or 
a “gene” focus, one could, again, look to relative number, here the relative 
number of cells designated “human” or of human origin. In fact the focus moves 
rapidly from the quantitative to the organization of differentiated cells and to 
organs. Then the question is whether to privilege some organs—if the being has a 
liver, a hand, an eye, a heart, or blood that is of animal origin on the human side 
or of human origin on the animal side. A decision must be made that some 
organs are more important to humanness or contribute to humanness more than 
other organs. In the ongoing work to make possible organ transplantation from 
animal to human, “xenotransplantation,” an effect on the individual identity of a 
being, that would be acknowledged as human before the combination of organs, 
has not been an issue, and we might think it unlikely that human identity would 
be affected by the growth of an organ “within” from cells of animal origin, rather 
than its implantation fully grown in xenotransplantation. Perhaps the same can 
be said in reverse, that human organs in an animal would not affect its animal 
identity. It is not entirely clear why it would not. There is much we do not know 
about the subtleties of the contributions of organs small and large to 
characteristics of the integrated “whole being.” Some take the hand or the throat 
to be the essential organ in the evolutionary development of the human. At one 
time or another the heart, the blood, or the liver (think of Homer’s Iliad33) were 
much more closely tied, in a privileged way, to the essence of a being, and such 
privilege may at some point fit again into the way we explain things. 
Nevertheless, I would think a mixture of organs in a hybrid would not determine 
humanness or nonhumanness or the degree of it. 
Except for the brain. The brain seems different. That organ serves very 
much as a proxy for characteristics that we value as human. With regard to 
relative numbers of cells, the fact that the brain of a mouse may contain one 
hundred percent human neural cells is more troubling than the fact that it may 
contain two or ten percent—the number alone is troubling, and there is the 
implication that the possibility of “humanness” would then reside in the cells 
                                                                                                                                                 
“The basis for the 14-day limit was that it related to the stage of implantation which I have just 
described, and to the stage at which it is still uncertain whether an embryo will divide into one or 
more individuals, and thus to the stage before true individual development has begun.”). See also 
DAVID ALBERT JONES, THE SOUL OF THE EMBRYO: AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATUS OF THE HUMAN 
EMBRYO IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION 224-227 (2004). The fourteen day point is also the point after 
which precursors of the central nervous system appear. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, 
supra, VOL. 2 at 56. 
  33. THE ILIAD OF HOMER 480-81 (Richard Lattimore trans., University of Chicago Press 1951) 
(Hecuba: “I wish I could set teeth in the middle of his liver and eat it. That would be vengeance 
for what he did to my son.”). On the hand, see Raymond Tallis’s intriguing account, THE HAND: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO HUMAN BEING (2004). 
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themselves. But the form and architecture of the brain, its “organness,” may be of 
greater significance as a proxy for the characteristics the brain’s life makes 
possible, and we in fact see proposals to periodically sacrifice developing mouse-
human hybrids with brains of various proportions (up to 100%) of human neural 
cells to examine the developing architecture, with the thought of perhaps 
stopping the experiment if architecture appeared that was typical of those brains 
of beings “fully human” that have been examined.34 The problem is that it 
appears that characteristics we recognize as having ourselves can be associated 
with cells of animal origin organized into brains of varying animal structure, 
operating as always with and through the contributions of organs beyond the 
brain, and brains resembling human structure can be associated with experience 
quite foreign to human experience.    35
We seem to leave behind these inconclusive numerical and material 
criteria when we move to characteristics themselves. I should note in passing, 
however, that there does seem to be something of an acquisition of human or 
animal identity at the cellular level, indicated by the fourteen day limit itself 
which I mentioned. At fourteen days of embryonic development the human 
genetic fingerprint as currently conceived and the differentiation of human cells 
at that point are wrapped, swaddled we might say, in the mantle of human 
individuality, and thereafter the being is no longer treated like the developing 
embryo identified as “animal.”36 Yet insofar as an animal is an individual in 
human sight, despite being an animal, and it has recognizable characteristics that 
we name with the same names we use for human characteristics that we value, 
then the cells, the very cells that we predict will become such a being if the 
systems of the world treat them favorably, are wrapped in a similar but unseen 
mantle. Whatever our developed religious commitments or convictions, there is 
an acknowledgment widely at work that living matter is truly incarnate—spirit 
and matter twisted around one another like the separate strands of DNA. It 
seems, at the moment, that from the fourteen day point onward, cells, if they 
include among them precursors of the cells that carry electrical and chemical 
charges which we call “neural” cells, are accorded respect in a way other aspects 
of the material world are not, even while ontology is recapitulating phylogeny. 
Furthermore, under current law they are accorded respect on something of an 
ascending scale as development proceeds, if, that is, they are designated 
“human” or perhaps “human enough.” The difference in the end, I wonder, may 
be only that embryos with neural differentiation that are designated “animal” 
must simply develop longer before the special respect attaches that is embodied 
                                                 
  34. See, e.g., Greely et al., supra note 3, at 37. 
  35. See, for example, the description of the structure of the brain of the mormyrid fish, which 
perceives and communicates through electrical fields, in SIMON CONWAY MORRIS, LIFE’S SOLUTION 
184-86, 189-90, 194-96 (2003). See also id. at 254-61, on the structure of cetacean brains. 
  36. See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 32, VOL. 1 at 45-47, 65, VOL. 2 at 56. 
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in criminal statutes, administrative regulations, and constitutional provisions 
protecting the interests of animals who have particular characteristics.   
So, to “characteristics,” the qualitative criterion of relative humanness that 
marches us into the eugenic problem.   
Let me state the situation more particularly, this time with reference to the 
identity that a “species” has provided for an individual in the past. In our 
present usage, including scientific usage, what makes a species a “species,” what 
gives an individual being a generic name beyond Joe or Whiskers, is not only an 
individual’s ability to reproduce something like itself, but an inability to 
reproduce something that does not look like itself, whatever the variations of 
detail upon which natural selection might work. The species boundary is 
determined, whenever there is sexual reproduction, by an inability to breed. 
Those with whom an individual can breed have the same species name beyond 
their individual names, while those with whom an individual cannot breed have 
a different species name beyond their individual names. Categorization of 
individual animal beings can follow different criteria than this—working animal, 
livestock, game animal, wild animal, service animal, companion animal—just as 
human beings have been classified along lines of race, color, and physiognomy—
Darwin’s “civilized” and “savage,” “Caucasian” and “Australian.”37 But species 
identity that takes into account the death of individuals, together with 
reproduction or what “springs off” living individuals, has staying power 
inasmuch as “what” is present in the world is what can reproduce. “What” 
cannot breed together do not leave offspring in the world, do not leave beings 
asking us present with them to say what they are and then determine what our 
behavior is to be toward them, either as individuals while they live, or as a kind. 
Hybridization circumvents that species barrier, and can present us with 
beings asking us, like Adam was asked at the beginning, to say what they are, 
give them a name, and decide how to treat them. If we treated all flesh with 
respect insofar as we were able, as the Jains in India are said to do, the question 
would not be such a terrible one. We could think not upon the horrors of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries but upon the achievements of our immediate 
past, especially the spread of an inner resistance to the ancient pull to enslave.38 
But as we know there are vast differences today between the way we treat flesh 
we identify as human and all other flesh, differences that have as their poles love 
at one end and confinement and torture at the other—the horrors of the factory 
farm, the testing laboratory, and, it must be said, what can happen in the 
university research laboratory. These we justify in utilitarian terms. Human 
                                                 
  37. See ROBINSON, supra note 20, at 34-35. 
  38. Evolutionary biology stated in terms of high and low and the human eugenics movement 
emerged at the same time in the mid-nineteenth century. It is intriguing that the human eugenics 
movement, looking to the elimination of categories of human beings, also emerged at the same 
time enslavement was being taken away as an optional course of action after perceiving a human 
being as of a lesser kind.   
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identity is not only an intellectual, aesthetic, or religious matter. Companionship 
and delight for us may be there beyond human identity, but horror and 
extermination lie beyond it in much greater measure.   
What do you do when species become unstable? This was Darwin’s 
question too, and On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or The 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life39 was Darwin’s answer. Now 
the question is being put to us in a new way. But this new way does not take our 
own human identity as a given. It asks us to say anew what we are, what it is to 
be human. 
Three significant documents have appeared in the last several years, 
addressing hybridization from within the scientific community. Congress has not 
addressed it, except in an appropriations act four years ago in response to the 
effort to patent a hybrid of human and chimpanzee in roughly equal parts, which 
provided that no funds could be “used to issue patents on claims directed to or 
encompassing a human organism.”40 There was no explanation of what 
Congress thought “encompassed a human organism.” 
In the absence of statutory guidance, a “Committee on Guidelines for 
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research” from the National Research Council of 
the National Academy of Sciences issued “Guidelines for Human Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research” in 2004, which inter alia took up hybridization.41 An ad hoc 
working group on “Moral Issues of Human-NonHuman Primate Neural 
Grafting,” with twenty-two members, published a report on that form of 
hybridization in the journal Science in 2005.42  In December 2006 an international 
task force formed by the International Society for Stem Cell Research published 
its own “Guidelines for the Conduct of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research,” 
which again addressed hybridization.43 
The ad hoc working group’s report on human-nonhuman primate 
hybridization is the most revealing. At its beginning the group says,  
We unanimously rejected ethical objections grounded on 
unnaturalness or crossing species boundaries . . . [A] concern is that 
H-NHP [human-nonhuman primate] neural grafting is wrong 
because it transgresses species boundaries. However, as the recent 
National Academy Report notes, the notion that there are fixed 
species boundaries is not well supported in science or philosophy . 
. . [W]e, like the National Academy, see “no new ethical or 
regulatory issues regarding chimeras themselves.”    44
                                                 
  39. See DARWIN, ORIGIN OF SPECIES, supra note 20. 
  40. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-99, § 634, 118 Stat. 3, 101 (2004). 
  41. NRC GUIDELINES, supra note 32. 
  42. Mark Greene et al., Moral Issues of Human-NonHuman Primate Neural Grafting, 309 SCIENCE 
385-86 (July 2005). 
  43. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 32. 
  44. See Greene et al., supra note 42, at 385. 
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The pronouns “we” and “us” appear frequently in this Report. But from 
what stance are these beings speaking? How confident they are that they 
themselves are human. Without the species line, the “crossing” or 
“transgressing” of which raises no special question for them, how do they know?   
What would they say to you or me, these twenty-two who were 
unanimous, if you or I raised the question whether these twenty-two were 
human, or sufficiently human? Certainly they know that genetically, in 
numerical rather than qualitative terms, they are already heavily “animal,” and 
that individuals now called human vary or are assumed to vary (since each 
individual cannot be examined) in the genetic mechanisms found within the 
body. Indeed individuals vary by quantitative measure apparently more within 
the old Darwinian “races” than between the races, and not just the so-called 
“deformed,” the so-called “defective,” or the so-called “disabled.”45 If sexual 
breeding is bypassed and the species line marked by it is dissolved, each of the 
twenty-two in the ad hoc working group is only, to begin with, a living being 
drawn from two (or more) living beings differing in their physical makeup as all 
living beings seem to do.   
On the question of humanness (including their own humanness) these 
twenty-two beings must move and they do move to the characteristics they 
value. “Value,” we may note, is explicitly excluded from scientific thought along 
with its parent “purpose” to give scientific method its demonstrated power, but 
here it reenters their thought. Value must reenter when the underlying question 
is one of action, action that could be taken or not taken, or could be aided, 
permitted, or restrained. With the move to valuing characteristics we are taken 
full circle back to the field of “animal law” that I described earlier, in which 
beings referred to in statutes or constitutions as just “animals” are categorized 
and ranked for purposes of decisions whether to recognize that they have 
interests of their own, and whether to protect their interests or weigh them 
against interests that are distinctively “ours.” 
To see this for oneself, I should say, one has only to read a collection of 
judicial opinions from trial and appellate courts in ordinary cases involving 
animals, for example denying force to provisions in wills for destruction of 
companion animals, or recognizing a trust with an animal beneficiary, or 
interpreting restrictive covenants in neighborhoods, or choosing a measure of 
damages in tort, or recognizing standing in human beings to sue on animals’ 
behalf, or finding “ripeness” for judicial review after weighing harms to animals, 
or applying import restrictions to protect them abroad, or, over and over, 
drawing the contours of criminal prohibitions against killing or torturing them.    46
                                                 
  45. See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, HUMAN GENETIC VARIATION 7-8 (1999). 
  46. See the collections in contemporary teaching materials in animal law in the United States, 
for example, WAISMAN ET AL., supra note 12; DAVID FAVRE, ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE, INTERESTS, 
AND RIGHTS (2008). 
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The range of characteristics noted and valued in animal law is wide—
responsibility of a moral kind on the part of an animal in a relationship of 
authority pointed toward a common purpose, possession of a language or a 
culture, social and family life, parental bonding, capacity for “psychological well-
being”47 (a phrase in the Animal Welfare Act of 1985), capacity for suffering that 
is different from physical pain, capacity for pain itself, companionable 
relationships with beings called human, love, loyalty, courage, on and on. 
Human beings do not always have the edge in some of these qualities, even in 
the eye of human judges in legal opinions. And what has been the result and 
somewhat the aim of legal inquiry into these is individuality in the living unit 
being considered, with all that flows from recognition of individuality.   
In the ad hoc working group’s report on hybridization by neural grafting, 
these capacities and characteristics merge with more general phenomena for 
which their words are general, “sentience,” “consciousness,” “self-awareness,” 
“anticipation, and perhaps fear, of individual death.” And they merge with 
capacities or characteristics pointed to by words used outside law or reports of 
this kind, to which the novelist J. M. Coetzee and the biologist Lewis Thomas 
turn, “fullness of being” or “joy.”48 The philosopher Alasdair McIntyre goes to 
recent work on dolphins to consider “virtues” and especially ways we with 
human life might break a self-imposed dichotomy between “natural” selfishness 
and “inexplicable” altruism, looking out to animals to recognize our own 
individual dependence on other human individuals, early in life, late in life, and 
in-between.49 
The scientist and bioethicist authors of the recent reports on hybridization 
are not judges, not legislators, not jurors, not representative at all as those 
involved in law’s development are asked to be. In contrast to the range of valued 
characteristics in animal law that has emerged over many years from judges, 
legislators, and jurors, what these scientists and bioethicists move toward as the 
characteristic of concern to them is, in the words of the ad hoc working group, 
“humanlike cognitive capacities” which can be assessed by “performance on 
cognitive tasks” and “observance of behavior,” not through relationships of a 
mutual kind but on the basis of behavior viewed from afar. The ad hoc working 
group goes on to recommend that  
experiments involving H-NHP neural grafting [“human” to 
“nonhuman” primate] be required, wherever possible, to look for 
and report changes in cognitive function. Explicit data collection on 
cognition and behavior will help to ensure that ethical guidelines 
can be developed appropriately as the field advances.    50
                                                 
  47. Animal Welfare Act (as amended), 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(B) (2007). 
  48. J.M. COETZEE, THE LIVES OF ANIMALS (1999); LEWIS THOMAS, THE FRAGILE SPECIES (1992). 
  49. ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE 
VIRTUES (1999). 
  50. See Greene et al., supra note 42, at 386. 
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“Cognition,” with its root in the word “knowledge,” can include much. But if 
one reads the background to its use here, “the cognitive” is something far more 
limited than the range of valuable human characteristics. Not surprisingly it 
focuses upon abilities to engage in manipulation of units (including living units) 
and perform tasks suggested by mathematical and quasi-mathematical logic. 
“Cognitive capacity” is closely related to “rationality” in both scientific and 
economic and social scientific thought generally.    51
Certainly choice of this particular capacity to value represents a breach in 
a vision of the world from which science qua science excludes value and purpose. 
Even the great Jacques Monod, after insisting that postulates of purpose 
anywhere in the universe are “animisms” that “exist at odds with objective 
knowledge, face away from truth, and are strangers and fundamentally hostile to 
science,”52 acknowledges cognitive capacity as a value. But it is presented as the 
only value. Where the question what is human is concerned, and what others 
will allow scientists or doctors to do to a creature, or scientists or doctors as 
humane citizens will allow themselves or others to do in particular cases,53 this 
capacity is not the only value. It is not even the most highly prized. The power of 
scientific thought in understanding and predicting the behavior of the systems of 
the world may be fully acknowledged while, at the same time, love, loyalty, 
capacity to bring out music, companionship that makes one not alone, 
cooperation, indeed physical strength may be much more highly prized than the 
capacity to manipulate. What is being shown in current reports focusing in on 
this capacity, when the question is the human, is the eugenic frame of mind, so 
easy, so very easy to slip into.   
That “cognitive capacity” is the particular capacity these particular 
authors of these reports are endowed with in greater measure than others is not 
disqualifying, no more than Darwin’s identification with his “civilized” racial 
status destroys the value of his insights. They and others like them are trying to 
be helpful. But they only propose. Over time “we,” that greater person who is 
not confined to the length of an individual life, must conclude, and conclude 
every time we act over time as time goes on.   
In observing this I think we may be observing that it is responsibility that 
marks us as human, responsibility the one aspect of sentience we specially bring 
                                                 
  51. See further discussion of this in Joseph Vining, Legal Commitments and Religious 
Commitments, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 69, 77-78 (2007); VINING, supra note 31, at 134-135; and Vining, 
The Resilience of Law, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE (James Boyd White & H. 
Jefferson Powell eds., forthcoming). 
  52. JACQUES MONOD, CHANCE AND NECESSITY: AN ESSAY ON THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
MODERN BIOLOGY 171 (1971). 
  53. It should be noted that though review boards for animal experimentation have a largely 
scientific composition, their members are mandated by the Animal Welfare Act to “represent 
society’s concerns regarding the welfare of animal subjects used”—not their concerns in their 
identity as scientists but society’s concerns, theirs as citizens under the law. Animal Welfare Act, 
7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1). 
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into the living world. The work of Vicki Hearne and Barbara Smuts54 should 
keep us open to the possibility that even this may be shared with nonhuman 
beings: so let me say “general responsibility,” for life itself, for the world, for 
vulnerable individuals including ourselves each a vulnerable individual.   
But, ultimately, contemplation of hybridization over time, even 
anticipatory discussion now of how to treat one or another hybrid if 
hybridization develops and spreads, may tease out not so much what makes us 
distinctive, or what makes us human who can be, as we know, so inhuman. It 
may tease out more what makes life in the universe so interesting and beautiful. 
It may help us resist the eugenic temptation. It may turn us around to value 
characteristics not for their closeness to what we see in ourselves or in some 
individuals we know, but for their strangeness, to value capacities we may not 
have. We know this is possible—mathematicians or saints give us who are not 
mathematicians or saints vicarious access to real worlds beyond those we 
experience directly. Then it may turn us again and lead us back from strangeness 
to a common music, that can appear time and again in evolutionary development 
and may not be the product of our history alone at all. The evolutionary biologist 
Simon Conway Morris has so beautifully traced this.55 The bird, the whale, the 
lowly mouse,56 and who knows what other forms of life can sing. Music may 
speak more truth to the mind than anything in words or numbers, and animals 
may participate with us in it. How fully they do we have only begun to perceive.   
After extended contemplation of hybridization we may well wish to pull 
back and do none of it. Even experimentation with it, in a situation of such 
uncertainty about the identity of the individuals being experimented upon, may 
risk giving up too much of the humanity we have achieved at so great a cost. But 
extended contemplation of what really is possible could just possibly lead us to a 
capacity for relationships of a kind that would make human beings, as now 
constituted, “not alone” in the universe. Instead of stopping with conclusions 
about how to treat individual mixtures of the human and the animal, we may 
move toward conclusions about how to treat all flesh. Growing out of the 
conflicted and inconsistent ways in which we have behaved in the past, we may 
be looking toward a new dispensation for life on earth.
                                                 
  54. See, e.g., HEARNE, supra note 25; Barbara Smuts, Reflections, in COETZEE, supra note 48, at 
107-20; Barbara Smuts, Encounters with Animal Minds, 8 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 293 (2001). 
  55. See CONWAY MORRIS, supra note 35, at 225-27, 436. 
  56. T.E. Holy & Z. Guo, Ultrasonic Songs of Male Mice, 3 PUB. LIBR. SCI. BIOLOGY 2177 (2005). 
My SONG SPARROW, supra note 31, looks at individuality in birdsong and its implications. A 
hybridization experiment on vocalization, by genetic engineering, has been done—replacing the 
mouse FOXP2 gene with the human version. See Nicholas Wade, Neanderthals Had Important 
Speech Gene, DNA Evidence Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at A14. 
